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Abstract 
Economic viability of the US corn ethanol industry depends on prices, technical and 
economic efficiency of plants and on continuation of policy support. Public policy 
support is tied to the environmental efficiency of plants measured as their impact on 
emissions of greenhouse gases. This study evaluates the environmental efficiency of 
seven recently constructed ethanol plants in the North Central region of the U.S., using 
nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA). The minimum level of GHG emissions 
(per gallon of ethanol produced) feasible with the available technology is calculated for 
each plant and this level is used to decompose environmental efficiency into its technical 
and allocative sources. Results show that, on average, plants in our sample may be able to 
reduce GHG emissions by a maximum of 6% or by 3,116 tons per quarter. Input and 
output allocations that maximize returns over operating costs (ROOC) are also found 
based on observed prices. The environmentally efficient allocation, the ROOC 
maximizing allocation, and the observed allocation for each plant are combined to 
calculate economic (shadow) cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These shadow 
costs gauge the extent to which there is a trade off or a complementarity between 
environmental and economic targets.  Results reveal that, at current activity levels, plants 
may have room for simultaneous improvement of environmental efficiency and economic 
profitability. 
 
 
Keywords: ethanol carbon footprint; environmental efficiency; shadow cost; data 
envelopment analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The U.S. corn ethanol industry has benefited from government support due to its 
potential to achieve a rather wide set of goals: mitigating emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG), achieving energy security (diversifying energy sources), improving farm incomes 
and fostering rural development among others. Continuation of policy support, however, 
is being debated due to doubts about the direct and indirect GHG effects of the industry. 
Moreover, the capacity of the industry to reduce GHG emissions per gallon of ethanol 
produced may also determine the opportunities opened to it in future carbon markets and 
in the National Renewable Fuel Standard program. This study provides information 
relevant to these issues by measuring the environmental performance of the industry in 
terms of GHG emissions per gallon produced and the economic cost (shadow price) of 
GHG reductions.  
Input requirements and byproducts’ yield per gallon of ethanol produced are critical 
in determining environmental performance. Previous studies have addressed the issue of 
input requirements and byproducts’ yield of ethanol plants. Using engineering data 
McAloon et al. (2000) and Kwiatkowski et al. (2006) measured considerable 
improvement in plant efficiency between 2000 and 2006. Shapouri, et al. (2005) reported 
input requirements and cost data based on a USDA sponsored survey of plants for the 
year 2002. Wang et al. (2007) and Plevin et al. (2008), reported results based on 
spreadsheet models of the industry (GREET and BEACCON, respectively). Pimentel et 
al. (2005) and Eidman (2007) reported average performances of plants although they do 
not clearly indicate the sources of their estimates. Finally Perrin et al. (2009) reported 
results on input requirements, operating costs, and operating revenues based on a survey 
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of seven dry grind plants in the Midwest during 2006 and 2007. This study does not 
report however results on the carbon footprint of ethanol plants. 
With the exception of Shapouri et al. (2005) and Perrin et al. (2009) all of these 
studies reported values corresponding to the average plant (not individual plants) which 
prevents comparison of relative performances. In addition, it is generally believed that the 
industry has become more efficient and technologically homogeneous since 2005. Since 
the data used in Shapouri et al. (2005) was collected in 2002 it may not be representative 
of current technologies in the industry. In contrast to Shapouri et al. (2005), Perrin et al. 
(2009) surveyed plants in operation during 2006 and 2007 and employed a much more 
restrictive sampling criterion (discussed below) which yielded a modern and 
technologically homogenous sample of plants. This sample is believed to be more 
representative of current technologies and is, hence, our data of choice to assess the 
environmental performance of plants. Based on these data the present study evaluates the 
environmental efficiency of seven recently constructed ethanol plants in the North 
Central region of the U.S. The returns over operating costs (ROOC)1
 
 that may be gained 
or lost by plants as a consequence of the effort to reach a given environmental target are 
also calculated and discussed. 
2. Materials and Method 
2.1. Data 
The environmental performance of a plant is evaluated on the basis of emission of 
greenhouse gases associated with its productive activity. Greenhouse gas emissions from 
                                                 
1 We evaluate economic performance based on returns over operating costs rather than profits. This is 
because capital costs are not included in our analysis. 
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plants were not directly measured but rather calculated based on observable inputs and 
outputs corresponding to each plant. In addition concerns regarding the environmental 
impact of ethanol production refer to life cycle2 GHG emissions and not only those 
emissions at the processing stage. Therefore we evaluate life cycle GHG emissions 
associated with observable inputs and outputs. Our observations consist of 33 quarterly 
reports of input and output quantities and prices from a sample of seven Midwest ethanol 
plants. Following the non parametric efficiency literature we refer to each observation as 
a decision making unit (DMU). Plants produce 3 outputs (ethanol, dry distillers grains 
with solubles (DDGS), and modified wet distillers grains with solubles (MWDGS)) using 
7 inputs3
 
 (corn, natural gas, electricity, labor, denaturant, chemicals, and “other 
processing costs”). 
2.2. Ethanol Plants: Characteristics 
Table 1 presents some quarterly characteristics of the seven dry grind ethanol plants 
surveyed. According to Table 1 the plants produced an average rate equivalent to 53.1 
million gallons of ethanol per year, with a range from 42.5 million gallons per year to 
88.1 million gallons per year.  The period surveyed included from the third quarter of 
2006 until the fourth quarter of 2007 (six consecutive quarters).  In addition plants could 
be differentiated by how much byproduct they sold as DDGS (10% moisture) compared 
                                                 
2 “Life cycle” in this case includes emissions taking place at three stages of the production process: corn 
production (farmers), ethanol production (biorefinery), and feedlot (byproducts from ethanol plants are 
given a credit for replacing corn as feed in livestock production). 
3 Results of our survey contained total expenditures in labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing 
costs. As a result we calculated implicit quantities for these inputs dividing total expenditures by their 
corresponding price indexes. Labor and management price index associated to the Basic Chemical 
Manufacturing Industries was obtained from http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_325100.htm#b00-
0002. Denaturant, chemicals and other processing costs were calculated based on the Producer Input Price 
Index for “All other basic inorganic chemicals”, http://www.bls.gov/pPI/. 
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to MWDGS (55% moisture). Variation on this variable was significant, averaging 54% of 
byproduct sold as DDGS, but ranging from one plant that sold absolutely no byproduct as 
DDGS to another plant that sold nearly all byproduct (97%) as DDGS. 
Finally, Table 1 briefly characterizes plant marketing strategies.  In purchasing input 
feedstock, five of the six plants purchased corn via customer contracts.  Similarly, in 
selling ethanol, five of the six plants used third parties or agents.  Byproduct marketing 
across plants displayed a higher degree of variance.  Marketing of DDGS was split fairly 
evenly between spot markets and third parties/agents.  An even higher variability was 
observed for MWDGS, where no one marketing strategy (spot market, customer contract, 
or third party/agent) was significantly more prevalent across plants than any other. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of inputs used and outputs produced by the 33 
DMUs in our sample. As mentioned before the basic observations in this study 
corresponds to a plant in a given quarter; so two quarters of the same plant are considered 
as two different observations as are two plants in the same quarter.  
 
2.3. Environmental Performance of Ethanol Plants 
2.3.1. Emissions Measurement 
No direct measurements of GHG emissions are available in this industry; however 
they can be calculated using engineering relationships. A number of computer packages 
have been developed to facilitate these calculations (Wang et al. 2007; Farrell et al. 
2006). We used the Biofuels Energy Systems Simulator4
                                                 
4 BESS is a software developed by a team of specialists in the Agronomy Department at the University of 
Nebraska, Lincoln (Liska, et al, 2009a, 2009b,  
 (BESS). The BESS model 
includes all GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels used directly in crop 
http://www.bess.unl.edu/ ) 
 7 
production, grain transportation, biorefinery energy use, and coproduct transport. All 
upstream energy costs and associated GHG emissions with production of fossil fuels, 
fertilizer inputs, and electricity used in the production life cycle are also included. Since 
these calculations involve modeling of crop production and feedlot and these display 
regional differences, BESS includes regional scenarios and an average scenario for the 
whole Midwest region. Plants in our sample are scattered across the Midwest and, hence, 
we have used scenario 2 in BESS “US Midwest average UNL” which is deemed 
representative of the whole region. 
The BESS calculations of GHG emissions associated with a dry mill plant are 
equivalent to the following linear relationship: 
 0.00668274 0.063015823 0.0007445 0.000316916 
 0.4197522186 0.407868 
Mg c NG elect Eth
DDGS MWDGS
GHG x x x u
u u
= + + +
− −
        (1) 
Where MgGHG  represents megagrams of life cycle CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases, cx  
is bushels of corn used by the plant, DDGSu  and MWDGSu  are tons of byproduct sold as 
dried and modified wet respectively by the plant, NGx  is the total amount of natural gas 
used by the plant measured in MMBTUs, electx  is total amount of kilowatt hours (kwh) of 
electricity used by the plant, and Ethu  is the plant’s ethanol production in gallons.  
Eq. (1) states that a bushel of corn used in a biorefinery is associated with about 
0.0067 megagrams of GHG emitted during the production of that bushel. DDGS and 
MWDGS have a positive and a negative component. The former is due to additional 
energy used in reducing moisture.5
                                                 
5 In particular MWDGS require the use of electricity to centrifuge the wet byproduct and DDGS require the 
use of natural gas for heating and drying the wet byproduct after the centrifuge. 
 The latter are “credits” attributed to byproducts (i.e. 
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reductions in GHG) due to the replacement of corn that would have been fed to livestock 
had the byproduct not been sold. The coefficient for ethanol production represents the 
combination of emissions associated with depreciable capital ( 0.0002050 ) and freight for 
grain transportation ( 0.000111916 ), expressed on a per gallon basis. 
Eq. (1) includes outputs ( ), ,j j j jEth MWDGS DDGSu u u u= and a pollution increasing subset of 
all inputs used by ethanol plants6 ( ), ,j j j jp c NG electx x x x= denoted by , where subindex p 
indicates pollutant. We can now re express Eq. (1) in vector notation. To do so we 
partition inputs and outputs into a column vector of pollution increasing inputs and output 
( ), , ,j j j j jc NG elect Etha x x x u= ' and a column vector of pollution reducing byproducts 
( ),j j jb MWDGS DDGSu u u= '.  The level of greenhouse gas emissions associated with a particular 
plant j  as a function of observable inputs and outputs can be expressed as: 
j j j
bGHG a uα β= +          (2) 
Where ( )0.0066,0.0630,0.00074,0.000316α =  is the 1x4 row vector of coefficients 
associated with pollution increasing categories ja , and ( )0.419752, 0.407868β = − −  is 
the 1x2 row vector of coefficients associated with pollution reducing byproducts jbu . 
 
2.3.2. Characterization of Potential Ethanol Technology From Individual Plant Data 
Plants are constrained by a technology transforming a vector of N  inputs 
( ) NNxxxx +ℜ∈= ,...,, 21  into a vector of M  outputs ( ) MMuuuu +ℜ∈= ,...,, 21 . Observed 
combinations of inputs used and outputs produced ( ),j jx u  are taken to be representative 
                                                 
6 As described before ethanol plants use 7 inputs in production. However only three of them increase life-
cycle emissions of GHGs: corn, natural gas, and electricity. 
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points from the feasible ethanol technology.  In this study we use data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) to infer the boundaries of the feasible technology set from the observed 
points, following the notation in Färe, et al.   
Observations from the technology consist of a sample of 33 DMUs producing 3 
outputs and using 7 inputs. The production technology can be represented by a graph 
denoting the collection of all feasible input and output vectors: 
( ) ( ){ }7 3, :GR x u x L u++= ∈ℜ ∈  
Where ( )uL , is the input correspondence which is defined as the collection of all input 
vectors Nx +ℜ∈  that yield at least output vector 
Mu +ℜ∈ . 
The frontier of the graph GR  and observed levels of inputs and outputs will serve as 
references for environmental efficiency assessment. 
 
2.3.3. Environmental Efficiency Measurement 
A given DMU (call it j) is deemed more environmentally efficient whenever it 
chooses a feasible (subject to the graph) combination of inputs and byproducts (DDGS 
and MWDGS) that results in lower GHG emissions while maintaining its ethanol 
production level at the observed value denoted by jEthu . Fixing ethanol production to its 
observed level, and assuming variable returns to scale and strong disposability of inputs 
and outputs the graph can be denoted by: 
( ) ( )
33
1
, , , : , , , 1,  1,...,33j j j j j jEth b b Eth Eth
j
GR V S u x u u zM x zN zu u z j
=
 
= ≤ ≥ = = = 
 
∑         (3) 
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Where z  depicts a row vector of 33 intensity variables, bM  is the 33x2 matrix of 
observed byproducts, jbu  is the 1x2 vector of observed byproducts corresponding to the 
jth DMU, N  is the 33x7 matrix of observed inputs, , jx  is the 1x7 vector of observed 
inputs corresponding to the jth DMU, Ethu  is the 33x1 vector of observed outputs, and 
j
Ethu  is the observed ethanol production by observation j.  
We define the set of all combinations of corn, gas, electricity and byproducts that 
result in lower emissions than those actually produced by the thj  DMU as: 
( ) ( ){ }, , , :j j j j j j j j j jg p b Eth p b x p b x p bGHG x u u x u x u x uα β α β′ ′ ′= + ≤ +     (4)   
Where xα  is a subset of the vector α  previously defined which does not include the 
coefficient for ethanol, i.e. ( )0.006682,0.063015,0.000744xα =  and the rest is as 
before.7
From Eq. (4) we can derive an isopollution line in DDGS and corn space, i.e. 
combinations of DDGS and corn that result in the same level of emissions keeping 
everything else constant. Fig. 1 depicts this set graphically in the corn and DDGS space 
(i.e. keeping everything else in the GHG equation fixed). The set 
 
j
gGHG  consists of all 
those points above the isopollution line as indicated by the arrows with direction 
northwest. 
                                                 
7 We denote the coefficient associated with ethanol by γ =0.000316. Ethanol production and its associated 
coefficient are included in both sets. However, since ethanol is fixed at the observed level jEthu , the 
complete version of the inequality is j j j j j jx p b Eth x p b Ethx u u x u uα β γ α β γ′ ′+ + ≤ + +  which after 
elimination is equivalent to the expression in (4). 
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In Fig. 1 the feasible technology set is represented by a graph displaying variable 
returns to scale and strong disposability of inputs and outputs as indicated by the arrows 
moving from the frontier ( ( )DDGS cu f x= ) with direction southeast. As clearly seen in 
Fig. 1, the set jgGHG  includes combinations outside the graph and hence not attainable 
by DMUs in the sample. The subset of observations in jgGHG  that belong to the graph 
and are hence attainable by DMUs is depicted by the intersection of both sets delimited 
by the bold lines in Fig. 1: 
( ) ( ), , , ,j j j j jg p b Eth EthGHG x u u GR V S u∩        (5) 
The thj  DMU could choose any alternative production plan within the area denoted 
by the bold lines to produce its ethanol production level, achieving a reduction in 
emissions while increasing DDGS or reducing corn or both simultaneously. In this study, 
the environmental technically efficient projection of a given observation to the boundary 
of the technology set follows a hyperbolic path defined by equiproportional reductions in 
inputs and increases in byproducts. The value of the proportionate change necessary to 
encounter the boundary, jgETE , is defined as the environmental technical efficiency of 
plant j: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }1, , min : ,   , ,j j j j j j jg p b Eth g p b EthETE x u u GHG x u GR V S uλ λ λ−= ∩ ≠ ∅  (6) 
Where λ  is a scalar defining the proportionate changes and the rest is as before. We 
calculated the value of ( ), ,j j j jg p b EthETE x u u  using MATLAB as indicated in Appendix A.  
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Environmental technical efficiency defined in Eq. (6) is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the 
distance from ( ),j jc DDGSx u  to point A which corresponds to the environmental technically 
efficient allocation in corn and DDGS space. 
Note however that point A does not correspond to the minimum feasible GHG level 
since it does not coincide with the point of tangency between the isopollution and the 
graph (point B). The allocation that achieves the minimum level of GHG emissions 
subject to the graph is called the overall environmental efficient allocation.  
Technically, we define this minimum feasible level of GHG emissions as: 
( ) ( ){ },min  +     . .  ( , ) , ,  p bj j j jEth x p b Eth p b Ethx uGHG u GHG x u u s t x u GR V S uα β γ= = + ∈  (7) 
Where ( )j jEthGHG u  denotes minimum emissions attainable by j subject to observed 
ethanol production jEthu , px  is the vector of pollution increasing inputs, bu  is the vector 
of byproducts and the rest is as defined before. The empirical calculation of Eq. (7) is 
described in Appendix B. 
Overall environmental efficiency, jgE , is measured by the hyperbolic distance 
between a given observation j and the isopollution line corresponding to ( )j jEthGHG u . 
The hyperbolic distance is computed through calculation of the reduction of observed 
inputs and equiproportional expansion of observed byproducts such that the isopollution 
corresponding to ( )j jEthGHG u  is reached. This is illustrated by Fig. 3 where overall 
environmental efficiency is the distance between ( ),j jc DDGSx u  and point C. 
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The hyperbolic movement from ( ),j jc DDGSx u  to C results from the following technical 
relationship. 
PROPOSITION. The measure of overall environmental efficiency, jgE ,  is related to 
minimum GHG in the following manner: 
( ) 1          1, 2,...,j j j j jg p gGHG E x E b j Jα β
−
= + =      (8) 
See Proof in Appendix C. 
We can decompose jgE  into purely technical environmental efficiency 
j
gETE   
(represented graphically by the distance between ( ),j jc DDGSx u  and A) and environmental 
allocative inefficiency jEAE  (represented graphically by the distance between A and C). 
Overall environmental efficiency can be expressed as: 
j j j
g g gE EAE ETE=          (9) 
Therefore, we can define allocative environmental inefficiency residually as:8
/j j jg gEAE E ETE=
 
         (10) 
Based on the solution to the problem described in Eq. (7) we calculate overall 
environmental efficiency by solving the implicit Eq. (8) for each observation. These 
measures of environmental efficiency and their decomposition, Eq. (10), are calculated 
for our sample of surveyed dry grind ethanol plants and reported in Table 3. The 
minimum feasible GHG for each DMU as defined by Eq. (7) is calculated fixing ethanol 
production at observed levels.  
 
                                                 
8 Environmental allocative inefficiency was illustrated in Fig. 2 by the distance between the iso-pollution 
corresponding to combination A  and iso-pollution corresponding to point D . 
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2.4. ROOC and Environmental Targets: Trade off or Complementarity? 
From Eq. (2) there is a clear relationship between GHG and the combination of inputs 
and byproducts. But there is also a relationship between combinations of inputs and 
byproducts and the level of ROOC. Therefore, in general, a change in GHG levels 
through reallocation of inputs and byproducts would bring about a change in ROOC. For 
a given level of ethanol production, the shadow price of GHG mitigation is the change in 
ROOC per unit change in GHG levels. The change in ROOC denotes the plant's 
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for a permit to emit GHG. We define the shadow 
price of a ton of GHG as:   
1 0
1 0 1 0
j j
j
GHG j j j j
WTPSV
GHG GHG GHG GHG
π π−
= =
− −
           (11) 
Where WTP  is willingness to pay for changing emissions from 0
jGHG  to 1
jGHG . 0
jGHG  
denotes the original level of GHG and 0
jπ  the corresponding level of ROOC. 1
jGHG  is 
the “targeted” level of GHG and 1
jπ  denotes ROOC at this targeted level. GHG level will 
be targeted at the minimum GHG (i.e. 1
jGHG = jGHG ), or alternatively at the level 
corresponding to maximum achievable ROOC by firm j, *
jπ , which we designate as 
*
jGHG . 
 
2.4.1. Shadow Cost from Observed to ROOC Maximizing Allocation 
We define the ROOC maximizing combination of inputs and byproducts (subject to a 
given level of ethanol production to make it comparable with the GHG minimizing 
combination) as the allocation that solves the following problem: 
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( )( ) { } ( ) ( )* ,, , , , ,  , , ,bj j j j j j j j j jEth Eth Eth Eth b b Ethx ur p r GR V S u Max r u r u p x  s.t. u x GR V S uπ = + − ∈      (12) 
Where jEthr  is the observed price of ethanol obtained by observation j, 
j
Ethu  is the 
observed level of ethanol production by j, bu  is the 2x1 column vector of variable outputs 
(DDGS and MWDGS), jr  represents the 1x2 vector of observed prices of variable 
outputs (byproducts)9 x obtained by observation j,  is the 1x7 vector of variable inputs 
(corn, natural gas, electricity, labor, denaturant, chemicals, and “other processing costs”), 
and jp  represents the 1x7 vector of observed prices of variable inputs paid by j. 
Quantities of labor, denaturant, chemicals and others needed to calculate GR  are 
obtained implicitly dividing total expenditures in these categories by their price indexes 
described in footnote 2. Prices for these categories in equation (12) are also those in 
footnote 2. We will denote the allocation that solves Eq. (12) with ethanol fixed at the 
observed level by { }* *( , )j jx u . The level *jGHG  is calculated by inserting these values 
into (2). 
We define the shadow value of GHG emissions associated with moving from the 
observed allocation to the ROOC maximizing allocation as: 
*
*
j j
j
GHG j jSV GHG GHG
π π−
=
−
             (13) 
An alternative shadow cost to Eq. (13) is that which is incurred by moving from the 
observed to the GHG minimizing combination of inputs and byproducts.  
 
                                                 
9 Three DMUs in our sample did not sell dried byproducts (they sold 100% MWDGS). Since we did not 
have reported DDGS prices for those three observations to calculate maximum ROOC we used average 
prices of DDGS obtained by other DMUs in the same quarter. 
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2.4.2. Shadow Cost from Observed to GHG Minimizing Allocation 
The GHG minimizing combination is computed by solving Eq. (7) with ethanol 
production fixed at observed levels and minimum GHG denoted by jGHG . ROOC 
associated with this allocation (calculated by multiplying the GHG minimizing inputs and 
outputs times their respective prices) is designated as jπ .  
We define the shadow value of GHG related to a change from the observed to the 
GHG minimizing point as: 
j j
j
GHG j j
SV
GHG GHG
π π−
=
−
             (14) 
Finally we consider the shadow value of GHG related to a change from the GHG 
minimizing to the ROOC maximizing point.  
 
2.4.3. Shadow Cost from GHG Minimizing to ROOC Maximizing Allocation 
Such a change is illustrated in Fig. 4 in the corn and DDGS space. In Fig. 4 the GHG 
minimizing combination is represented by point B (the isopollution line is denoted by 
jGHG ). If relative prices are those corresponding to the slope of *
jπ   then ROOC 
maximization is achieved at point A and this requires a decrease in corn and DDGS with 
respect to the GHG minimizing point. ROOC at A are denoted by *
jπ  and ROOC at B are 
*
j jπ π< . Emissions at B are denoted by jGHG  and emissions at A are *
jjGHG GHG> .  
The shadow value associated with a change from the GHG minimizing combination 
to the ROOC maximizing one is defined by: 
*
*
j j
j
GHG jj
SV
GHG GHG
π π−
=
−
             (15) 
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3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Environmental Performance of Ethanol Plants 
Fixing ethanol production at observed levels, measures of environmental efficiency 
and their decomposition are calculated for our sample of surveyed dry grind ethanol 
plants and reported in Table 3. Results reveal that DMUs are very efficient from a 
technical point of view and that most environmental inefficiency comes from allocative 
sources. Therefore DMUs seem to have room for GHG reductions mainly by changing 
input and output combinations subject to the graph. In particular, the average DMU may 
be able to reduce emissions by 6% which amounts to 3,116 tons of CO2 equivalent 
GHGs per quarter (or 0.46 pounds per gallon of ethanol produced).  
The average DMU in our sample, at observed allocations, displays a GHG intensity 
of about 46 gCO2e/MJ. At the GHG minimizing allocation, the average DMU in our 
sample displays a GHG intensity of 43 gCO2e/MJ which is 6.5% lower than observed 
levels. This intensity is, for example, 55% lower than the target standard established by 
California by 2019 (86.27 gCO2e/MJ). It is of interest to know what reallocations of 
inputs and byproducts may actually achieve this improvement and we will go back to this 
point in detail later. 
 
3.2. ROOC and Environmental Targets 
Shadow costs associated with moving from observed to ROOC maximizing 
allocations are reported in Table 4. Given the rather large variability across observations 
both the median and the average are reported as measures of central tendency. Table 4 
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displays some observations that are unusually high and others unusually low. These 
disproportionate deviations from the average are due to changes in inputs that affect 
ROOC but do not affect emissions, i.e. labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing 
costs. These inputs are labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing costs. We 
classify as “outlier” any observation whose value exceeds the average by more than 3 
times the standard deviation. 
Since there seems to be a great deal of variability in shadow prices of GHG across 
DMUs we have plotted a histogram that shows the approximate distribution of these 
values in Fig. 5. The histogram does not take into account those observations deemed as 
outliers. We have superimposed to the histogram a normal density function that smoothes 
out the distribution. An important conclusion we can extract from Table 4 and Fig. 5 is 
the fact that almost all DMUs reduce GHG emissions by moving from observed to 
maximum ROOC (negative shadow values). This suggests that, under our convexity 
assumptions, most DMUs (including the arithmetic average and the mean of the normal 
density function) may be able to increase ROOC and reduce GHG simultaneously which 
would in turn imply that these DMUs face no trade off between economic and 
environmental goals at current combinations of inputs and byproducts.  
The fact that DMUs can rearrange inputs and byproducts in such a way that they can 
both increase ROOC and reduce emissions prompts the following questions:  
 What inputs are reduced or increased and which byproduct is reduced or increased 
in such a rearrangement? 
 Why are plants not exploiting these reallocations that achieve greater ROOC? 
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The answer to the first question for the average plant is provided in Table 5. The 
average DMU would achieve greater ROOC and lower GHG simultaneously mainly by 
reducing the use of corn, natural gas, and electricity per gallon of ethanol produced, 
reducing the production of MWDGS, and increasing production of DDGS. A part of 
these reductions is achieved through elimination of inefficiencies that would take the 
DMUs to the technological frontier but for the most part they are achieved through 
rearrangements along the surface described by the boundary of the graph, Eq. (3). 
Rearrangements displayed in Table 5 imply giving up MWDGS to increase DDGS and 
reduce inputs. They are feasible in the sense that they achieve an allocation already 
achieved by some other DMU in the sample or a convex combination of allocations 
observed in the sample.  
The answer to the second question is not as straightforward. As noted in the 
discussion of the first question our DMUs may be able to increase ROOC and reduce 
GHG mainly by reducing corn, natural gas, and electricity per gallon of ethanol produced 
and per ton of DDGS produced.10
There are many potential reasons for the failure of DMUs to attain the ROOC-
maximizing allocation. First plants may not face market conditions that allow them to 
reallocate byproducts from dry to wet or viceversa. A rather significant livestock 
production relatively near the plant has to be in place for DMUs to be able to sell a 
 The apparent engineering (in)ability to maximize 
ethanol and DDGS yields when compared to other DMUs in the sample seems to drive 
the difference between observed production plans and ROOC maximizing plans for many 
DMUs. A note of caution is in place here.  
                                                 
10 Reductions in MWDGS may come as a surprise. However given relative prices it appears this was a 
convenient reallocation for many DMUs. 
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significant portion of their byproduct as wet. These market constraints are not captured 
by our analysis. Second the graph is assumed to be convex in our calculations. Under the 
assumption of convexity any difference in performance is attributed to efficiency 
differences rather than to technological constraints. However there may be indivisibilities 
in the construction and later modifications (expansions or contractions) of plants that 
result in non-convexities of the graph, i.e. scaling up or down of production in any 
proportion may not be feasible or may be very expensive once capital costs are accounted 
for. These non-convexities would prevent plants from choosing the ROOC-maximizing 
allocation depicted by the convex graph, rendering economic inefficiencies. 
Shadow costs associated with moving from observed to GHG minimizing allocations, 
Eq. (14), for each DMU, average, and median are reported in Table 6.  Nine DMUs lose 
ROOC while reducing GHGs, thus facing positive shadow values of GHGs, meaning a 
cost.  Seventeen DMUs increase ROOC while reallocating to the minimum GHG level. 
The fact that the average willingness to pay for a change in allocation ( j jEπ π− ) is 
positive while average change in GHG is negative, results in negative average shadow 
values. Table 6 indicates that the average DMU may be able to increase ROOC while 
reducing GHG which again seems to suggest unexploited opportunities to improve both 
fronts. In particular the average DMU may be able to increase ROOC by about $39 per 
ton of GHG reduced.  The seventeen firms with negative shadow prices would 
presumably be willing to sell permits at any small price, since there is no ROOC lost 
from reducing their own GHGs. 
Since there seems to be a great deal of variability in shadow prices of GHG across 
DMUs we have plotted a histogram that shows the approximate distribution of these 
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values in Fig. 5. The histogram does not take into account those observations deemed as 
outliers. The presence of outliers is mainly due, as discussed above, to changes in inputs 
affecting ROOC but not GHG, i.e. labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing 
costs. We have superimposed to the histogram a normal density function that smoothes 
out the distribution. Despite the variability across DMUs, the highest frequency of 
shadow values (i.e. most of the “mass” of the distribution) appears to be located around 
zero. This means that plants are approximately efficient in the sense that they are 
operating at levels for which the marginal value of GHG is around zero which is, in turn, 
the current GHG price that DMUs face. 
According to Table 7 the average DMU achieves minimization of GHG through 
substantial reductions in DDGS and MWDGS which in turn allows it to significantly 
reduce natural gas and electricity. Finally reductions in corn per gallon of ethanol are also 
involved in this GHG minimization. Such reallocations not only achieve reductions in 
GHG but also increase ROOC (negative shadow value) 
Shadow costs associated with moving from GHG minimizing to ROOC maximizing 
allocations, Eq. (15), for each DMU, average and median are reported in Table 8. All 
DMUs increase both ROOC and GHGs in moving from low GHG solution to high 
ROOC solution. The average DMU would forfeit $1,726 in ROOC for each ton of GHG 
reduced, a very high cost of regulation if that firm were required to reduce GHGs. If 
DMUs are forced to reduce GHG emissions below ROOC maximizing levels, these 
shadow values indicate that they would be willing to purchase permits if the market value 
is in the vicinity of $20 to $30 per ton, rather than reduce one ton of GHG emissions. The 
histogram (with superimposed normal density) corresponding to Table 8 is plotted in Fig. 
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6.  This histogram as the one in Fig. 5 does not take into account those observations 
classified as outliers. Again, despite the variability across DMUs, the highest frequency 
of shadow values (i.e. most of the “mass” of the distribution) appears to be located 
around a very high value. 
The reallocation of inputs and byproducts that would take the average DMU from the 
GHG minimizing to the ROOC maximizing combination is displayed in Table 9. The 
average DMU achieves increases in ROOC mainly through substantial increases in 
DDGS which in turn entails increases in natural gas and electricity, and reductions in 
MWDGS. Another very important component of ROOC increases is reductions of corn 
per gallon of ethanol produced.  
Results for the average DMU in Tables 4, 6, and 8 can be combined to recover the 
shape of the relationship between GHG and ROOC. Plotting the three averages in the 
GHG and ROOC space yields the graph in Fig. 7. We denote the observed combination 
of the average by ( ),j jGHG π , the ROOC maximizing combination by ( )* *,j jGHG π , and 
the GHG minimizing combination by ( ),j jGHG π . There seems to be room for 
simultaneous improvement of environmental and economic performance, as previously 
indicated in discussions of Tables 4 and 6. However, if the average firm were able to 
adjust inputs and byproducts to the ROOC maximizing combination, it would face an 
intense trade off described just above. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the merits 
and potential of the ethanol industry in the US by investigating the current environmental 
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performance at the individual plant level, the potential for improvement in this 
performance and its effects on the industry’s overall emissions of greenhouse gases.  
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, our results suggest 
that decision making units (DMUs) may have some room for improving environmental 
performance. However since plants are technically very efficient, most of this 
improvement has to come from changes in combinations of inputs and byproducts along 
the frontier (reduction in environmental allocative inefficiencies). By eliminating 
allocative inefficiencies the average DMU could apparently decrease emissions by 6%, 
which amounts to about 3,116 tons of CO2 equivalent GHG. 
Negative shadow values of GHG from observed to ROOC maximizing combinations 
reveal that at current operating levels DMUs may be able to increase ROOC and reduce 
GHG simultaneously by reaching the “best practice” in the sample. Plants may not be 
switching to the ROOC maximizing combination because of capital costs involved in that 
reallocation. If such costs exist they are not being accounted for here. However these 
costs may be outweighed by revenue opportunities created through carbon reducing 
policies, e.g. renewable fuel standards, carbon markets, tax credits for carbon reducing 
capital investments, etc.  
Additionally once DMUs achieve the ROOC maximizing allocation, our results 
suggest that they may face significant ROOC losses if they are forced to reduce GHG any 
further. In this case the average DMU in this sample would be willing to pay up to $1,726 
for a permit to emit ton of GHG, rather than suffer the ROOC reduction revealed by the 
shadow price of reducing carbon from ROOC maximizing to GHG minimizing levels. 
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The measurement of corn ethanol plants environmental performance, their potential 
for improvement, and ROOC/emissions trade offs conducted in this study should inform 
the debate on whether there is a place for corn ethanol as a “clean” substitute for 
gasoline. In particular our results suggest that ethanol plants in our sample can produce 
energy with considerable lower (52% lower) GHG intensity than gasoline. Moreover 
these plants have some room for reducing this footprint even more by reallocating inputs 
and byproducts. Such reallocations would achieve a 6.5% reduction in GHG rendering 
energy with a GHG intensity 55% lower than gasoline. In turn these reductions may be 
achieved at a moderate or none economic cost as strongly suggested by a negative 
shadow price of $39 per gallon. Further reductions, however, can only be achieved at 
high economic costs. 
 
Appendix A 
The measure in (6) can be mathematically implemented through the following 
nonlinear programming problem: 
(A.1)   
,
1
                 
. . ,  ,  ,  1
z
j j j j
b b Eth Eth
j
Min
s t u M z u zM x Nz z
λ
λ
λ λ− ≤ = ≥ =∑
    
Where jbu  is the vector of dried and wet byproducts, bM  is the 2xJ matrix of observed 
levels of byproducts, z  is the Jx1 vector of intensity variables used to weight 
observations and construct the piecewise linear boundary of the graph, jx  is the column 
vector composed by observed values of all inputs used by observation j, N  is the 7xJ 
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matrix of observed values of inputs for all observations, and jEthu  is the observed level of 
ethanol production of the thj  DMU. 
After multiplying the constraints times λ  it is easily seen that this is equivalent to the 
following problem: 
(A.2) 
,
2
       
. . ,  ,  ,   ,  ,  
z
j j j j
b b Eth Eth
j
Min
s t u M z x Nz z u M z z zλ λ λ λ
′Γ
Γ
′′ ′ ′ ′≤ Γ ≥ = = Γ = =∑
  
Following  Färe et al. problem (A.1) is reformulated into problem (A.2) because the 
only nonlinear constraint is an equality constraint (i.e. 2λ=Γ ) and is, hence, easier to 
program. In particular, these sub vector hyperbolic measures of technical efficiency are 
calculated through a nonlinear program implemented with the FMINCON procedure in 
MATLAB.  
 
Appendix B 
The following program describes the problem: 
(B.1)  
, ,
0.00668274 0.063015823 0.0007445 
                              0.4197522186 0.407868                  
 . . ,   z,  ,    
DDGS MWDGS
c NG electx u u
DDGS MWDGS
j
DDGS DDGS MWDGS MWDGS Eth Eth
Min GHG x x x
u u
s t u M z u M u M z x N
= + +
− −
≤ ≤ = ≥ ,    1j
j
z z =∑
 
Where DDGSu  is the vector of dried byproducts, DDGSM  is the 2xJ matrix of observed 
levels of DDGS, z  is JX1 vector of intensity variables, MWDGSu  is the vector of modified 
wet byproducts, MWDGSM  is the 2xJ matrix of observed levels of MWDGS , x  is the 
vector of all inputs, and N  is the 7xJ matrix of observed levels of inputs. This program 
was calculated using the LINPROG routine in MATLAB. 
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Based on this quantity, we calculate overall environmental efficiency by solving for 
j
gE  implicitly through Eq. (8) for each observation. 
 
Appendix C 
Proof:  
Let us denote the vector of coefficients of Eq. (1) by ( ),xα β , where xα  is the vector of 
coefficients for corn, natural gas, and electricity, and β  is the vector of coefficients for 
both byproducts. In addition, let us define an arbitrary output and input vector by ( ),p bx u  
where ( ), ,p c NG electx x x x=  and ( ),b MWDGS DDGSu u u=  and denote the thj DMU’s observed 
output and input vector by ( ),j jp bx u . 
Let ( ) ( )( )1, ,j j j j jp b g g p b gx u GHG E x u E GR−∈  , then ( ),p bx u GR∈  and since jgE  is a 
minimum: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0.00668274 0.063015823 0.0007445
0.407868 / 0.4197522186 /
j j j j j j
x p b g c g NG g elect
j j j j
MWDGS g DDGS g
x u E x E x E x
u E u E
α β+ = + +
− −
 
Let us denote observations j’s minimum feasible GHG level by jGHG . There are three 
cases to consider:  
1. Assume ( ) jx p bx u GHGα β+ < , then ( ),p bx u GR∉  
2. Asume ( ){ }jx p bx u GHGα β+ > , then 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, : , :jx x x p bv w v w GHG v w v w x uα β α β α β+ ≤ ⊆ + ≤ +  and since the 
hyperplanes defining the two sets are parallel, jgE  can not be a minimum. 
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Cases 1 and 2 leave the following case: 
3. ( ) jx p bx u GHGα β+ = . Therefore ( )1 jj j j jg x p g bE x E u GHGα β−+ = . 
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Fig. 1 - Isopollution and Sets 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 - Environmental Technical Efficiency 
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Fig. 3 - Decomposition of Overall Environmental Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 - Shadow Cost from GHG Minimizing to Profit Maximizing Allocation 
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Fig. 5 - Histogram of Shadow Values (observed to ROOC-maximizing) 
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Fig. 6 - Histogram of Shadow Values (observed to GHG-minimizing) 
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Fig. 7 – Histogram of Shadow Values (GHG Minimizing to Profit Maximizing)  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 - ROOC and GHG 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of the seven surveyed plants 
States 
Represented Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, S. Dakota, Wisconsin 
 
Annual 
Production 
Rate (million 
gal/year) 
Smallest 42.5 
Average 53.1 
Largest 88.1 
 
Number of 
Survey 
Responses by 
Quarters 
03_2006 5 
04_2006 6 
01_2007 7 
02_2007 7 
03_2007 7 
04_2007 2 
Percent of 
Byproduct Sold 
as Dry DGS 
Smallest 0 
Average 54 
Largest 97 
 
Primary 
Market 
Technique 
 Corn Ethanol DDGS MWDGS 
Spot 0 0 3 1 
Customer Contract 5 1 0 1 
Third Party/Agent 0 5 2 2 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics: Inputs and Outputs 
  
Corn  
(million 
bushels) 
Natural Gas 
(thousand 
MMBTUs) 
Electricity 
(million kwh) 
Ethanol 
(million 
gallons) 
DDGS 
(thousand 
tons) 
MWDGS 
(thousand 
tons) 
Average 4.8 361 7,8 13.7 21.3 14.5 
Std Dev 0.9 61 1.5 2.8 10 15.4 
Min 3.6 297 6.7 10.6 0 0.2 
Max 8 569 13.3 22,9 34.2 56.2 
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Table 3. Environmental Efficiency Decomposition 
DMU 
Technical 
Environmental 
Efficiency 
Allocative 
Environmental 
Efficiency 
Overall 
Environmental 
Efficiency 
Reduction 
of GHG 
(tons)[a] 
Reduction 
of GHG 
(%)[b] 
1 0.977 0.983 0.961 3,268 6 
2 1 0.931 0.931 6,227 11 
3 0.985 0.970 0.956 3,617 7 
4 1 0.951 0.951 3,801 7 
5 1 0.993 0.993 567 1 
6 0.979 0.993 0.973 2,331 4 
7 1 0.948 0.948 4,697 9 
8 1 0.947 0.947 4,704 8 
9 1 1 1 0 0 
10 0.997 0.959 0.956 3,539 7 
11 1 0.989 0.989 950 2 
12 1 1 1 0 0 
13 1 0.940 0.940 8,007 9 
14 1 0.949 0.949 4,625 9 
15 1 0.944 0.944 4,804 9 
16 1 0.974 0.974 2,015 4 
17 1 0.985 0.985 1,098 2 
18 1 0.938 0.938 5,178 10 
19 1 0.987 0.987 1,133 2 
20 1 1 1 0 0 
21 1 0.947 0.947 4,611 9 
22 1 0.967 0.967 2,736 5 
23 1 0.974 0.974 2,023 4 
25 1 0.985 0.985 1,199 2 
26 1 0.970 0.970 2,614 5 
27 1 1 1 0 0 
28 1 0.917 0.917 7,941 14 
29 1 0.956 0.956 3,708 7 
30 1 0.961 0.961 3,068 6 
31 1 0.964 0.964 2,831 6 
32 0.993 0.980 0.973 2,239 4 
33 1 0.992 0.992 684 1 
34 1 0.914 0.914 8,662 14 
Average 0.998 0.967 0.965 3,116 6 
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Table 4. Shadow Values of GHG: observed to profit maximizing combination 
DMU 
WTP for change in 
allocation, *
j jπ π− ($)  
Change in GHG emissions, 
*
j jGHG GHG−  (tons) 
Shadow Value of 
GHG ($/ton) 
1 948,565 -2,618 -362 
2 1,483,022 -5,648 -263 
3 2,094,972 -2,728 -768 
4 1,223,985 -3,105 -394 
5 619,562 120 5,147 - outlier 
6 1,263,224 -1,920 -658 
7 1,515,535 -4,100 -370 
8 2,398,535 -4,405 -545 
9 3,199 0 INFINITE 
10 850,101 -2,636 -322 
11 719,229 -264 -2,726 
12 1,382 0 INFINITE 
13 2,175,472 -7,709 -282 
14 1,597,466 -4,026 -397 
15 1,751,089 -4,339 -404 
16 825,632 -1,027 -804 
17 1,692 0 INFINITE 
18 1,540,254 -4,555 -338 
19 1,230,951 -488 -2,521 
20 258,318 295 877 
21 1,797,859 -3,726 -483 
22 1,975,711 -2,035 -971 
23 781,594 -344 -2,269 
24 1,041,712 -332 -3,141 
25 2,192,398 -1,990 -1,101 
26 9,613 0 INFINITE 
27 2,301,210 -7,495 -307 
28 1,252,438 -3,075 -407 
29 1,439,841 -2,291 -629 
30 1,106,262 -1,801 -614 
31 727,808 -1,367 -532 
32 1,396,934 271 5,154 - outlier 
33 1,865,307 -8,663 -215 
Average 1,420,685 -3,052 -466 
Median 1,439,841 -2,636 -546 
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Table 5. Reallocation from observed to profit maximizing combination 
Category 
Measure Corn Natural Gas Electricity Dry Wet 
Average Change (%) -5.88 -3.83 -0.41 26.03 -10.23 
 
 
Table 6. Shadow Values of GHG: observed to GHG minimizing combination 
DMU 
WTP for change in 
allocation, j jEπ π−  ($) 
Change in GHG emissions, 
j j
EGHG GHG−  (tons) 
Shadow Value of  
GHG ($/ton) 
1 659,193 -3,268 -202 
2 443,897 -6,227 -71 
3 134,209 -3,617 -37 
4 -343,266 -3,801 90 
5 286,956 -567 -506 
6 -526,747 -2,331 226 
7 294,875 -4,697 -63 
8 610,737 -4,704 -130 
9 -18,561 0 INFINITE 
10 -886,553 -3,539 250 
11 260,637 -950 -274 
12 -817,158 0 INFINITE 
13 1,728,919 -8,007 -216 
14 432,472 -4,625 -94 
15 -221,003 -4,804 46 
16 -788,455 -2,015 391 
17 -842,611 -1,098 767 
18 1,041,500 -5,178 -201 
19 326,317 -1,133 -288 
20 -542,483 0 INFINITE 
21 -417,870 -4,611 91 
22 1,343,752 -2,736 -491 
23 -373,408 -2,023 185 
24 -839,949 -1,199 700 
25 1,600,339 -2,614 -612 
26 -263,194 0 INFINITE 
27 307,697 -7,941 -39 
28 176,556 -3,708 -48 
29 164,586 -3,068 -54 
30 -327,399 -2,831 116 
31 -649,530 -2,239 290 
32 -611,531 -684 894 
33 1,046,320 -8,662 -121 
Average 138,988 -3,548 -39 
Median 176,556 -3,268 -54 
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Table 7. Reallocation from observed to GHG minimizing combination 
Category 
Measure Corn Natural Gas Electricity Dry Wet 
Average Change (%) -3.05 -6.83 -1.35 -33.63 -4.11 
 
Table 8. Shadow Values: GHG minimizing to profit maximizing combination 
DMU 
WTP for change in 
allocation, *
j j
Eπ π−  ($) 
Change in GHG emissions, 
*
j j
EGHG GHG−  (tons) 
Shadow Value of 
GHG ($/ton) 
1 289,372 650 445 
2 1,039,125 579 1,794 
3 1,960,763 889 2,206 
4 1,567,251 695 2,254 
5 332,607 688 484 
6 1,789,971 411 4,355 
7 1,220,660 597 2,044 
8 1,787,797 300 5,964 
9 21,760 0 INFINITE 
10 1,736,654 903 1,923 
11 458,592 687 668 
12 818,540 0 INFINITE 
13 446,554 298 1,500 
14 1,164,994 599 1,945 
15 1,972,092 465 4,240 
16 1,614,087 988 1,633 
17 844,302 1,098 769 
18 498,754 622 801 
19 904,634 645 1,403 
20 800,801 321 2,493 
21 2,215,729 886 2,501 
22 631,958 701 901 
23 1,155,002 1,679 688 
24 1,881,661 868 2,168 
25 592,059 623 950 
26 272,807 0 INFINITE 
27 1,993,513 446 4,474 
28 1,075,882 632 1,701 
29 1,275,255 777 1,641 
30 1,433,661 1,030 1,392 
31 1,377,339 872 1,580 
32 2,008,466 955 2,104 
33 818,987 0 INFINITE 
Average 1,243,777 721 1,726 
Median 1,220,660 687 1,778 
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Table 9. Reallocation from GHG minimizing to profit-maximizing point 
Category 
Measure Corn Natural Gas Electricity Dry Wet 
Average Change (%) -2.75 2.82 0.94 12.45 -97.65 
 
 
